Firewalls/NATs have brought significant connectivity problems along with their benefits, causing many applications to break or become inefficient. Due to its bi-directional communication, huge scale, and multi-organizational nature, the Grid may be one of the areas damaged most by the connectivity problem. Several ideas to deal with the connectivity problem were investigated and many systems are available. However, many issues still remain unanswered. Most systems are firewall/NAT unfriendly and are considered harmful to network security; the tussle between these devices trying to investigate payloads and applications trying to protect their content from observation and modification must be reconciled. This paper discusses how a simple relay-based system, called XRAY (middleboX traversal by RelAYing), deals with these issues and provides other benefits such as flexible traffic control. This paper also discusses how relay-based traversal systems can help applications to communicate over firewalls/NATs and also complement firewall/NAT operations to help network security.
Introduction
Firewalls and NATs [1] (collectively called middleboxes' in this paper) provide many benefits such as easy address planning, network protection, and a solution to the IPv4 address shortage. However, these devices come at a price, notably non-universal connectivity of the Internet. In general, two endpoints separated by one or more middleboxes cannot communicate with each other. The Internet has become asymmetric because most middleboxes allow outbound (to the world) but block inbound (from the world) 1 Though IETF uses "middleboxes" to refer to more than just NATs and firewalls [13] , it currently focuses on those two devices.
communications. Due to this connectivity problem, many applications break or become inefficient. The Grid [2] may be one of the most damaged areas because it generally requires bi-directional and manyto-many connectivity among geographically distributed organizations. Client-server applications can get around the asymmetry problem by placing servers in publicly accessible places such as a DMZ. This approach does not work for the Grid because a node may act both as a client and a server. In grids, the connectivity problem generally results in the waste of resources because researchers may not harness resources separated from their networks by middleboxes. Computing jobs cannot be staged from the public network into a network behind a middlebox, and vice versa [4] [5]; data placement cannot be completed because data cannot move into or out of a network behind a middlebox.
Middleware approaches are very attractive for dealing with the connectivity problem. They are easy to deploy because neither the Internet nor operating systems need be changed, and many applications can benefit from them. Especially middleware providing APIs similar to the Berkeley socket API is desirable for easy deployment because it is well understood and is used by many network applications. Many middleware traversal mechanisms were studied or are under investigation for dealing with the connectivity problem. However, we still have many problems and issues left unanswered:
Middlebox friendly? Some traversal systems, "often ironically called firewall-friendly" [17] , have adverse effects to network security. Some systems, notably in P2P file sharing systems, disguise their traffic to deceive middleboxes (or administrators).
Other systems such as GCB [10] , STUN [II], and TURN [12] exploit common middlebox behavior or configuration to the extent that network administrators never intended. For this reason, network administrators generally consider middlebox traversal systems to harm network security and are reluctant to deploy them. Systems such as DPF [10] , SOCKS [14] , and RSIP [15] have little or no adverse effect on network security. However, these systems suffer from similar problems because they do not describe how their traversal mechanisms fit in with network security enforcement. * Asymmetry. Most middleboxes are configured to allow outbound connections while blocking inbound ones. Using this common practice, previous systems assume that outbound connections are allowed and help applications only with inbound connections. More and more organizations want to control communications in both directions for reasons such as security and legal issues. To support such restrictive organizations, a traversal mechanism must help both inbound and outbound connections in a controlled manner.
* "Tussle" [31 between applications and middleboxes. Many applications encrypt contents with strong security mechanisms to protect their payloads from observation or modification. On the other hand, some middleboxes want to inspect payloads for better filtering, intrusion detection, etc.
When those middleboxes cannot look inside packets, they generally drop packets. Therefore, we must find a resolution or reasonable compromise of this tussle. This paper discusses how well a simple relay based system, called XRAY (middleboX traversal by RelAYing), deals with these issues and provides other benefits such as flexible traffic control. XRAY helps authorized applications to traverse middleboxes by relaying both inbound and outbound traffic. It also helps network security by dropping packets for unauthorized applications. Since it provides the Berkeley socket API, any network application can be easily XRAY enabled. In our previous work [16] , we presented CODO (Cooperative On-Demand Opening), which provides similar benefits as XRAY for organizations using the middleboxes that can be dynamically controlled by the add-on software we provide. However, unlike CODO, XRAY does not require dynamic control over middleboxes and has no restrictions on the type of middlebox it can support. XRAY also provides stronger control over traffic with a minor amount of performance overhead compared to CODO. SOCKS [14] also shares many characteristics and benefits with XRAY. However, it is designed only for client-server applications and may not be used by the Grid. We will further explain this and another limitation of SOCKS in §9.
Relaying mechanisms have been considered as a secure way of middlebox traversal for years. Our contribution is (1) the reconsideration of the relaying mechanism as a middlebox traversal system in a broader and formalized context and (2) XRAY, a relaybased system, which realizes the benefits of the relaying mechanism.
In §2, we present a packet flow model within a middlebox and define the middlebox traversal problem within that model [16] . We include the model to make the paper self-contained. In §3, we introduce a concept that is important to secure traversal of middleboxes. The architecture and connection procedure of XRAY are presented in §4 and §5, respectively. §6 discusses the fault tolerance issue and §7 explains the implementation. §8 and §9 present performance data and related research, respectively.
Model and Problem Definition
The middlebox traversal problem has been around for many years, yet it remains vaguely defined, raising many questions such as "if a middlebox is opened for an application, does it blindly pass packets to/from the application?" and "how does a traversal mechanism fit in the security policy the middlebox tries to enforce?" To avoid confusion, we define the problem as follows.
Middleboxes 
Owner Binding
To perform the owner test, a middlebox must know whether the packet under scrutiny is for an authorized application or not. In addition, knowing the sender/receiver applications of authorized packets is essential for logging and for performing further application specific tests (i.e. auxiliary tests in figure 1 ). 4. Architecture Figure 2 shows a typical topology of XRAY. Each middlebox trusts one or more XRAY agents of the network it protects and bypasses some tests for packets addressed to/from them. Each XRAY agent is assigned a set of authorized applications and relays traffic for them but drops for others. To use XRAY, organizations must add or change a few middlebox rules but need not change middleboxes. Figure 3 shows XRAY components and their interactions. The figure also shows how XRAY fits in the packet flow model of §2. A middlebox filters or passes ordinary packets using various tests as explained in §2. However, it performs only the application neutral test for packets to/from an XRAY agent and delegates the remaining tests to the agent. An XRAY agent has a list of authorized applications that can communicate over its middlebox. Since the middlebox and the XRAY agent collectively enforce the security policy of the network, the list must be considered as a part of middlebox rules. The XRAY library reports, via XRAY commands, its XRAY agent about the application's activities such as listening on a socket, trying to connect a socket to a server outside its network, and closing a socket. Using this information and XRAY commands from remote sites, the agent dynamically creates (and deletes) relay points for the application as needed and optional plug-ins that the administrator defines for that application. Plug-ins can be used for application specific tests or logging. To make sure that only authorized applications can have relay points and accompanied plug-ins, XRAY uses strong security mechanisms for XRAY command exchanges. Strong security mechanisms also protect each relay point so that only intended application or the next hop can communicate through it. Inbound packets for an authorized application (1) undergo the application-neutral test at the middlebox, (2) are authenticated and integrity checked by the key protecting the relay point, (3) and undergo auxiliary tests defined by plug-ins attached to the relay point. The relay point, plug-ins, and the middlebox's application-neutral tests check the outbound packets, in that order. Note that a network can use XRAY and other traversal mechanisms together. In this case, traffic for XRAY-enabled applications (or claim-to-be) is controlled by the XRAY mechanism, while others are controlled by their mechanisms.
XRAY provides many benefits; either as the direct result of using the relay mechanism or those connected to packets, but others can be avoided or mitigated through careful design. We will explain how XRAY mitigates these performance problems in the following sections.
Connection Procedure
With XRAY, applications call XRAY functions. The call sequence is the same as with a Berkeley socket. For instance, a server creates a TCP socket, binds it to an address, makes it passive, and accepts connections from clients. A client creates a TCP socket, optionally binds it to an address, and connects it to a server. The server and client exchange data through the established connection. This section explains how XRAY connections are established and data are transferred over middleboxes as responses to XRAY calls from applications.
Server binding
In order to be able to accept connections from outside, server sockets behind a middlebox must be locally bound, registered to the XRAY agent of its network, and officially bound.
Local binding is just the regular process of binding a socket to an address. Through the local binding, an (IP, port) pair, called the local address, is assigned to the socket.
Since inbound connections are arranged by the XRAY agent of the network, enough information about a server socket must be kept in it. The registration process provides necessary information to the agent.
After a server socket is bound to a local address, the server's XRAY library sends a registration request with the local address and the type of the socket. After authentication/authorization and the official bind (explained shortly), the agent records the information sent by the library and other information that it collects from the official binding process.
Official binding is the process of assigning the official address, public/globally unique address, to a server socket. This is necessary to support server sockets locally bound to private addresses. When the agent receives a registration request with a private local address, it finds a public address and leases the address to the server socket. This leased address becomes the official address of the socket. Of course, if the local address is public, then the local address becomes the official address without address leasing. As a successful response to the registration request, the agent replies with the official address.
Now that a socket could have two addresses: local and official addresses, while Berkeley socket API allows only one per socket, what address shall be known to the application? The answer is the official address as its name implies. When the application asks (by calling getsockname) for the address that an XRAY socket is bound to, the library returns the official address instead of the local (real) address.
After the binding process, a server socket can become locally bound, half bound, or fully bound. A socket is in the locally bound state if it is locally bound to a private address but could not lease a public official address because its XRAY agent is not available at binding time. Sockets in this state can accept connections that are possible without XRAY's help. A fully bound socket has a public official address (either leased or not) and is successfully registered to its XRAY agent. Sockets in this state can benefit from XRAY service. Both intra and inter network connections are possible.
A half bound socket occurs when registration with the agent is not possible or cancelled, but a global address is assigned. This happens when the agent is not available at the time of binding, but the socket's local address (and therefore official address) is public. A socket also becomes half bound when a socket was fully bound, but later it is deleted from the agent because of agent or network failure. As with locally bound sockets, sockets in this state can only accept connections that do not require XRAY service. However, they can become fully bound whenever the agent or the network recovers from the failure. Sockets in the half bound state periodically try to become fully bound. Note that locally bound sockets cannot be upgraded to the fully bound state because official addresses would be changed as the result of the upgrade.
Connection setup
This section explains how a client makes a connection, over middleboxes, to a server registered to its XRAY agent through the process explained in §5.1. We also assume that the client knows the official address of the server socket via an out-of-band mechanism. First, we explain how a client behind a middlebox makes a TCP connection to a server behind a different middlebox. This is the most complex and hardest situation. Connections for simpler cases are similar with some steps omitted. For UDP communications, a very similar procedure is performed when the application tries to send UDP data, by calling XRAY_send or XRAY_sendto, to a peer for the first time or after a certain inactive period. The following steps establish a connection: Connection establishment within a private network also needs help from XRAY agents. A client within the same private network as a server cannot make a direct connection with the (leased) official address of the server. In this case, the XRAY agent of the private network replies to client's connection request with the server's local address so that the client can make a direct connection to the server. No relay points are created for intra network connections.
Data communication
The result of the connection setup process is a communication channel between a client and a server composed of one or more overlay links connected together via relay points. Because data are encrypted and decrypted by each hop, relay points have the full access to the contents, while still providing appropriate level of end-to-end protection and secrecy to applications.
Each relay point can have site-specific and application-specific plug-ins attached to it. These plugins form a chain to be executed. Data arriving at a relay point are decrypted, checked by each plug-in in order, encrypted using the secret key for the next link, and forwarded to the next hop.
XRAY provides the application transparency for underlying mechanisms not only for connection setup but also for data communication. We use block ciphers to secure each overlay link. It is not trivial to provide the stream-based semantics of TCP over record-based communication of block ciphers. For example, select must not return read ready when the network buffer has a partial record that cannot be decrypted. Instead, the application should be informed that it can read something from the network only when full records have been received and successfully decrypted. Similarly, select should not return write ready when the network buffer has small space that can hold only a partial record. To provide the application TCP's stream semantics, XRAY has a buffering mechanism that translates stream (of clear text) to record based communication (of cipher text), and vice versa.
Fault tolerance
Successful connection depends on the reliability of XRAY agents. Nevertheless, applications should continue to work with a limited ability in the event of agent failure. For example, when an agent is down, connections that do not require the service from the agent should continue working.
When an agent is down, XRAY tries to provide as much service as possible. The local bound and half bound status explained in §5.1 enables server sockets to continue to be able to accept intra network connections. If a client's XRAY library cannot contact an agent, it tries a direct connection to the server as if the agent were not needed.
If an agent recovers from its failure, sockets that were affected by the failure should become fully functional. To achieve this goal, we just need to upgrade half bound sockets to fully bound status so that they can accept connections from outside. The XRAY library periodically tries to contact the failed local agent. If successful, it registers the information of sockets to the agent and upgrades them to fully bound status. 
Implementation
The XRAY library is implemented in C/C++ as a layer between the application and the kernel. Figure 4 (a) shows the results for connection setup. XRAY connections take 27 msec on average, which is 1.67 times slower than regular OpenSSL connections. For each XRAY connection, five secure TCP connections are made in this experiment: two for XRAY command exchanges between the client and the client agent and between the client agent and the server agent, respectively; three overlay links for end-to-end channel between the client, the client agent, the server agent, and the server. Considering the number of connections and interactions in XRAY, connection times are surprisingly short. We determine that two factors help XRAY's connection performance. First, the parallel connection setup of end-to-end channel (i.e. three connections in this case) reduces the overall connection time. Second, XRAY uses the session resumption [8] helps middleboxes to perform quality owner test; it controls both inbound and outbound traffic; it uses strong security mechanisms to protect unauthorized applications from having owner test rules created for them. CODO is more efficient than XRAY because with CODO applications communicate directly through holes made at middleboxes. However, the owner test CODO constructs is less secure than the owner test XRAY constructs. With CODO, attackers can cause owner test false positives using address spoofing, which is impossible with XRAY. CODO also has an additional requirement that middleboxes provide an API for dynamic control. Therefore, XRAY supports more organizations and provides more secure traversal while CODO provides secure and efficient traversal.
SOCKS [14] is also similar to XRAY. It enables communications through a middlebox by a proxy that relays connections. The proxy is applicationindependent and can be configured to use strong security mechanisms to authenticate applications. However, SOCKS does not have the concept of address leasing to server sockets ( §5.1) and generally does not support private networks. SOCKS is also designed only for client-server applications and cannot support applications such as P2P and the Grid. In SOCKS, each application must act as a client or a server, but not both. A client application may accept connections over middleboxes. However, these passive connections must be secondary connections and a part of an active session that is initiated by an active primary connection. FTP is a good example. A SOCKS-enabled FPT client can establish an active connection (the control channel) to an FTP server behind a middlebox and then accept a passive connection (the data channel) from the same server. However, with SOCKS, a client application cannot have an independent passive socket to accept connections from arbitrary endpoints. Other middlebox traversal mechanisms both middleware and fundamental approaches are reviewed in [10] and [16] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed middlebox traversal problem in a broader and formalized context of network security and presented a relay-based middlebox traversal system, called XRAY. XRAY is a middlebox-friendly system, which helps not only applications to communicate with the world but also middleboxes to better filter traffic. XRAY controls both inbound and outbound traffic in a secure manner. Middleboxes can achieve a practically error-free owner binding and owner test. Additionally, the conflict of interests between applications and middleboxes can be appropriately addressed with XRAY. Our experiments also showed that XRAY provides such benefits at reasonable performance overheads.
